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  3. The Strategic Grid: Classifying the Role of Information Systems

The Strategic Grid: Classifying the Role of Information Systems

Originator

McFarlan and McKenney, 1983

Field

Strategy, information systems

What it answers

How much should a business invest in its information systems?

Where it is used

Information systems modules, IT governance, portfolio planning

The strategic grid classifies a business by how much its information systems matter — now and in the near future. It produces four positions, and each carries different implications for how much is spent, who decides, and how closely the board should be involved.

Its value is that it refuses a single answer. The question of how much a company should invest in systems has no general answer, because the correct amount for a business whose operations stop when the systems stop is not the correct amount for one where they are an administrative convenience.

The two dimensions

The strategic impact of existing systems. How dependent is the business on the systems it already runs? The test is what happens when they fail. If an hour of downtime halts revenue, existing impact is high. If a day of downtime is an inconvenience absorbed by manual workaround, it is low.

The strategic impact of the applications portfolio under development. How far will planned systems change the way the business competes? The test is whether the pipeline is maintenance and incremental improvement, or whether it contains things that would alter the product, the channel or the cost base.

Assessing these separately is the discipline the model imposes. A business can be highly dependent on what it has and have nothing significant planned, or be barely dependent today with a development programme intended to change that, and the two positions call for opposite responses.

The four quadrants

Support. Low existing dependence, low future dependence. Systems are administrative: accounting, payroll, reporting. They matter, in the way that any necessary function matters, and they are not a source of advantage. The correct posture is cost control. Standard packages rather than bespoke development, outsourcing where it is cheaper, and a governance level that keeps the topic off the board's agenda. Most professional service firms and many small manufacturers sit here, and the failure mode is over-investment driven by enthusiasm rather than need.

Factory. High existing dependence, low future dependence. The business cannot operate without its current systems, and the development pipeline holds nothing transformative. Airlines, utilities, logistics operations and most manufacturers with integrated production planning are the classic occupants. The correct posture is reliability: availability, disaster recovery, capacity, security and the careful management of technical debt. Spending here buys continuity, not advantage, which makes it politically difficult to justify, and the failure mode is starving maintenance until an outage makes the case retrospectively.

Turnaround. Low existing dependence, high future dependence. The systems currently in place are not critical, and a programme under way is expected to make them so. This is a transitional position by definition: a business moving to a new channel, digitising a manual process, or building a capability that will become the operating spine. The correct posture is executive attention and project discipline, because the business is about to become dependent on something that does not yet work. The failure mode is treating a transformation programme with the governance appropriate to the support quadrant it is leaving.

Strategic. High existing dependence, high future dependence. Systems are both the operating platform and the source of competitive advantage, and the development pipeline continues to change how the business competes. Banks, insurers, exchanges, telecommunications operators and online retailers are the standard examples. The correct posture is integration: systems planning and business planning are the same exercise, the function is represented at board level, and the capability is built internally and not bought, because what is bought is available to competitors too.

What the grid is actually for

Three uses, and they are different from each other.

Deciding governance. The quadrant determines who should be making the decisions. A support business does not need its systems on the board agenda; a strategic business that leaves them to a functional manager has misallocated attention. This is the model's most defensible application, because it addresses a question organisations answer badly by default — usually by governing systems at the level appropriate to where the business was a decade ago.

Calibrating spend. The grid does not give a number, and it gives a shape. In support, minimise. In factory, spend on resilience and measure it against the cost of failure, not against a peer benchmark. In turnaround, concentrate on delivery of the specific programme. In strategic, fund continuously, since the advantage decays.

Identifying misalignment. The most useful output is a mismatch between where the business sits and how it behaves. A factory business running its systems like a support function is accumulating an outage. A support business staffed and governed as though it were strategic is spending money for a return that is not available to it.

Movement between quadrants

The grid is frequently taught as a static classification, which loses most of its value. Positions move, and almost always in the same direction.

The dominant movement over the last several decades has been from support to factory and from factory to strategic, driven by the digitisation of processes that were previously manual. Very few industries have moved the other way.

The movement happens through the turnaround quadrant, and that is the transition where organisations fail. A business enters a programme with the governance, skills and supplier relationships of its old quadrant and emerges dependent on systems it does not have the capability to run. The recognisable symptom is a successful implementation followed by two years of operational difficulty.

The practical instruction is therefore to build the operating capability during the programme rather than after it: the support and resilience arrangements appropriate to the destination quadrant have to exist on the day the business becomes dependent, not be assembled once the dependence has been demonstrated.

Reading it alongside the applications portfolio

The grid classifies the business. A companion technique classifies the individual applications within it, and the two are frequently confused, so the distinction is worth stating.

The applications view sorts each system by its contribution: those the business currently depends on, those that are critical to sustaining future strategy, those that may become important, and those that are valuable but not critical. A single company therefore holds systems in all four categories at once, whatever quadrant the business as a whole occupies.

The relationship between the two is straightforward once separated. The grid answers how much attention the topic deserves at the top of the organisation. The applications view answers which specific systems should receive investment and which should be left alone or retired.

Using one where the other is needed produces two recognisable errors. Classifying the business as strategic and concluding that every system deserves bespoke development is the first, and it is expensive. Classifying individual applications carefully while governing the whole function at support level is the second, and it leaves nobody senior enough to make the trade-offs between them.

Limitations

The model dates from a period when information systems were a distinguishable function with a distinguishable budget, and two criticisms follow.

The first is that almost every business is now in the factory quadrant at least, so a framework whose purpose is to distinguish businesses has less to distinguish. That is fair as far as it goes, and the response is that the distinction between factory and strategic still does real work: being unable to operate without systems is not the same as competing through them, and conflating the two produces the over-investment the support quadrant was meant to prevent.

The second is that the boundary between systems and the business has dissolved. Where the product is delivered through software, asking about the strategic impact of information systems is asking about the strategic impact of the business, and the question loses its meaning.

A third criticism concerns sourcing. The model assumes the capability in question is one the business either has or builds, and a great deal of what would once have been development is now a subscription. That changes the cost profile without changing the dependence: a business whose operations stop when an external platform is unavailable is in the factory quadrant whether or not it wrote the software, and the resilience obligation transfers into contract terms, exit arrangements and the question of what happens if the supplier fails.

Two further limitations are practical. The assessment is qualitative and self-administered, and a function assessing its own importance is not a neutral party. And the grid addresses how much to invest and where to govern, while saying nothing about which applications to build, which is the question most planning exercises actually face.

How it is examined

Questions present a company and ask to classify it and justify the classification, usually with recommendations.

Do the two dimensions separately and explicitly. State what would happen if the current systems failed, and what is in the development pipeline, because those two statements are the assessment and everything else follows from them.

Justify the placement from the case rather than from the industry label. A regional airline with outsourced reservations is not in the same position as a carrier running its own platform, even though both are airlines, and the marks are for reading the specific facts.

Then give recommendations matched to the quadrant: cost control and standard packages in support, resilience and recovery in factory, project governance and capability building in turnaround, board-level integration and continuous investment in strategic. Where the case suggests movement, say which transition is under way and what has to be in place before the business becomes dependent.

Common questions

What are the four quadrants of the strategic grid?

Support, factory, turnaround and strategic, formed by combining low or high dependence on existing systems with low or high dependence on systems under development.

How is the position assessed?

By asking what happens to the business if current systems fail, and separately whether the development pipeline would change how the business competes. The two answers are independent and are assessed separately.

What does the factory position require?

Investment in reliability and not in advantage: availability, disaster recovery, capacity, security and maintenance. The spending buys continuity, which makes it harder to justify than development spending and more costly to defer.

Why is the turnaround quadrant the risky one?

Because the business is becoming dependent on systems it is not yet organised to run. The operating capability for the destination position has to be built during the programme, not after it.